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1    Introduction 
In the conventional interpretation  of historians (Bliss 1997), the National Policy tariff was 
indispensable for the growth of Canadian manufacturing in the nineteenth century.  Judging 
by the leading mainstream economic history textbooks (Marr and Paterson 1980, Pomfret 
1993, and Norrie, Owram, and Emery, 2008), however, economic historians consider the 
question unsettled compared to historians.  For example, Dales (1966) appears contradictory 
in his stance, but overall did not accept a large tariff effect on Canadian manufacturing 
growth in the second half of the 19th century. Bertram (1963) saw continuous growth of 
manufacturing in the 19th century Canada, which also leaves little room for the effect of the 
National Policy on industrial growth.      
If we can show through a careful quantitative study of the growth of cotton textiles, an 
industry that many  agree grew because of the National Policy, actually, did not so do, then 
economic historians would have hard evidence to support their belief that the National Policy 
was not indispensable and historians may be more easily persuaded that they need to 
reconsider their position on this important question.    
Canada’s cotton mills grew at a remarkable 15percent a year between 1870 and 1890, as 
measured by imports of raw cotton, (see Table 1, below),the output of the industry doubling 
every five years. Looking around the world at cotton mills in 16 other countries in which 
modern factory-based cotton mills were to be found, only the Japanese mills grew faster.  The 
cotton mills of Britain and the United States, the oldest and the largest centres of modern 
cotton textile production, trailed far behind at 2 and 5percent, respectively.1 
Historians, as McCullough (1991) tells us, have had little good to say about Canada’s 
cotton mills. Partly, we suspect, because historians do not realize how fast the industry 
actually grew prior to 1879; partly because of their reputation, as harsh, monopolistic, and 
exploitive employers of labour; and probably, most importantly, because of the deep-seated 
idea that the National Policy tariff of 1879, or the NP as Victorian Canadians called it, was 
indispensable to the rapid growth of the cotton mills.2 
McDiarmid (1946, p. 190) claimed “[cotton textiles] received a substantial impetus from 
the National Policy.” Naylor (1975, vol. 1, p. P.49) says“[t]he process of domesticating the 
cotton industry climaxed with the National Policy.” DeLottinville (1980, p. 102) also claims 
that the “[cotton textiles’ growth] was due almost entirely to the [NP] tariff restrictions.” 
Williams (1979), the voice of moderation, referring to the growth of manufacturing generally, 
                                                 
1  For a description of experience of the cotton sectors in other countries and continents see the edited 
volume by Farnie and Jeremy (2004). 
2  McInnis (2000) labels the industry a “laggard” and describes its growth as “meagre,” because it did 
not establish itself in the first half of the nineteenth century. But this is to hold the industry to an 
unrealistic standard. See Hinton (2012) for an analysis of the relatively late arrival of the cotton 
industry in Canada.  
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remarks, ”[w]hile it would be difficult to isolate the tariff as the only, or even the principal 
cause of ... industrial growth, it clearly played a central role.”   
 
Table 1 Annualized Growth Rates of World’s Cotton Mills, in % 
(As measured by raw cotton imports or consumption) 
 
Country 1870-1890 1890-1910 1870-1910 
UK 2.2 1.0 1.0 
US 5.2 4.6 3.9 
Germany  3.8 3.6 3.7 
Russia 6.0 3.6 4.8 
France 1.2 3.9 2.6 
India 10.0* 3.5* 6.4* 
Austro-Hungary 4.3 3.3 3.8 
Italy 10.1 3.4 6.7 
Japan  19.2* 12.8 14.5 
Spain 4.6 1.6 3.0 
Belgium 3.5 4.0 3.7 
Switzerland -1.8 -0.4 -1.1 
Canada 15.0 4.2 9.5 
Portugal 8.2 3.8 5.8 
Netherlands 4.5 4.3 4.4 
Finland 5.5 2.9 4.1 
 
*Growth in the number of spindles    
Source: See Appendix 1. 
 
Michael Bliss’s (1987) treatment of the cotton mills growth under the NP from the 1880s to 
the 1900s in his business history Northern Enterprise is typical of the historical literature’s 
position on the indispensability of protection.3 In his narrative Bliss highlights three of a 
tariff’s six possible effects. 4 (1) From 1879 to 1883, he says rising profits induced a 
remarkable increase in output and investment (the production or protection effect).  (2) Then, 
increased domestic production drove out imports (the trade effect).  And (3) after 1883, he 
tells us, when the increased domestic production proved too much for the domestic market to 
                                                 
3  Bliss 1987, pp.301, 304, and 305. For similar accounts see McCullough 1994, Naylor 1975, 
Pomfret1993, and Taylor and Baskervile 1994. 
4  Kindleberger 1974 lists 10 effects. Only 6 apply directly to the growth of an industry. The other four 
are macroeconomic: the terms of trade effect, internal income distribution effect, balance of payments 
effect, and employment effect. There are of course also the innumerable non-economic effects of a 
tariff, (see Stigler 1947 for a discussion) that captured the centre of attention in the debate over 
protection among nineteenth century politicians and which we have no time to consider in this paper. 
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absorb, the industry struggled through an over-production crisis.  It attempted to escape the 
crisis by price-fixing cartels, 1883-1889, the dumping of Canadian cloth in foreign markets, 
and, finally, the orchestration of large-scale, horizontal mergers for monopoly power in1890, 
1892, and 1905 (the monopoly effect). 
Our interest is primarily with the NP’s production or protection effect. We argue that the 
conventional wisdom among historians rests its case for the power of the NP on an illusion.  
Cotton textile production was growing fairly rapidly  for a short period after the introduction 
of the NP, but, as we show, it had been growing at a rapid pace for the previous three decades 
and was in fact an  already  sizeable sector   before the coming of the NP.   
Three  questions will serve as the organizing framework for our test: 
1. How big and how long-established was the industry on the eve of the NP?  
2. How protective were the new NP tariffs on cottons? 
3. How fast did the industry grow after the introduction of the NP? 
2    How Big and How Long-Established? 
On March 15, 1879, the day the NP went into force, the gross value of output of factory 
produced cotton textiles in Canada was probably in excess of $2.5 million,5 making it a 
sizeable domestic manufacture. If other factory-based enterprises were the creation of the NP, 
“cutlery, clocks, felts, tableware,” says P.B. Waite (1975, p. 138), for example, did not exist 
before the NP, the same cannot be said for cotton textiles.  It was not new to Canada. In 
Quebec the factory production of cotton textiles had been taking place for 35 years, the first 
mill being built at Chambly, in 1844, closely followed by one at Sherbrooke.  In Ontario 
cotton mills had been around for 32 years, the first mill being established at Thorold in 1847.  
In New Brunswick, cotton textiles had been made in factories for 18 years, the first cotton 
mill opening at Saint John in 1862. Only in Nova Scotia did cotton mills first appear after the 
NP, the first mill opening at Windsor in 1882. In no other province did cotton mills appear 
before WWI (Hinton 1990, 1994a, and 1994b).  
3    How Protective Was the NP? 
How much more protective were the 20, 25, and 30 percent, plus, NP duties than the 15 and 
17.5 percent  revenue tariffs of the 1870s or the 15 and 20 percent incidentally protective 
tariffs of the 1850s and 1860s? One way to measure the effective protectiveness of the tariff is 
to calculate its Barber mark-up: the maximum potential mark-up on the costs of converting 
                                                 
5  Estimated as the average of Urquhart’s (1993, p. 389) estimates for “cotton textiles” gross value of 
product 1878 ($2.1 million) and 1879 ($2.9 million). Other manufacturing industries of roughly the 
same size ($2 to $3 million) included distilleries, paper, and railway equipment. 
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raw cotton – purchased at world prices –into yarn and cloth.6 Typically, Canadian historians 
have seen the pre-NP tariffs as being low. Firestone (1960, p. 218), for example, says, tariffs 
“afforded only slight protection to industry” in the 1850s, 1860s, and 1870s. The Barber 
mark-up tells a very different story. In the early 1850s, the 12.5 per cent tariff of the day in 
central Canada delivered a mark-up of 25 per cent. The incidentally protective 20 percent 
Cayley-Galt tariffs of 1858-59 delivered a mark-up of 68 percent. The 15 percent compromise 
revenue tariffs of the late 1860s and early 1870s brought the mark-up down to 47 percent. 
Finally, the 17.5 percent additional protection given by the Liberals last revenue tariff 
increased the mark-up to 57percent.   
With rates of protection like these, and a host of other causal factors at work – such as 
growth in population and GDP, falling domestic and international transportation costs, the 
development of factor and product markets, and the invention and diffusion of new machinery 
and methods in cotton spinning and weaving, such as ring spinning, the power loom and later 
the automatic loom - one well might expect Canadian cotton textiles to have taken off in a 
rapid growth spurt as early as the 1850s. And as we will see in the next section this is exactly 
what happened.   
Measuring of the potential protectiveness of the NP is a more difficult task than it is for 
earlier tariffs because the NP tariff was more complicated schedule, but it is simple enough to 
get a clear idea of the possible range of protectiveness by measuring the Barber mark-up 
delivered by ad valorem equivalent NP tariff ranges of 20, 25, 30, and 35percent, which 
covers the full range of imported cotton goods competing with the goods produced by 
Canadian mills and, then, compare these mark-ups to those delivered by the older so-called 
revenue or incidentally protective tariffs. The maximum potential Barber mark-up, assuming 
conservatively the cost share of raw cotton to domestic firms was 0.5  (see Hinton 2012),  
comes to 40 percent for goods paying 20 percent, 50 percent for goods paying 25 percent, 
60percent for goods paying 30 percent, and a whopping 70 percent for goods, like prints in 
1884, paying 35 percent.7  With maximum potential rates of protection like these it is no 
wonder there was a mad rush to invest in cotton mills in the early 1880s.8 But it is also 
                                                 
6  See, Barber 1952, Dales 1964, and Mackintosh 1937. We are indebted to a paper by Harley (2001) for 
reminding us of this simple and elegant approach to measuring protectiveness. The mark- up, it is 
easy to show,  is equal to the ad valorem or ad valorem equivalent tariff, t ,divided by 1 - Sc (1 + t), 
where Sc is the Canadian industry’s cost share of raw cotton, which was in 1870 (see Hinton 2012) 
just under 60 percent. 
 
7  According to the Census of 1870 the share of raw cotton costs in the gross value of production of 
cottons was 0.59. 
8  Inwood and Keay(2013)  point out the NP also led to new capital investments in the iron and steel 
industry.   
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possible, as we have suggested, that the tariffs of the late 1850s were so high as to be to a 
large extent redundant and by the late 1870s almost entirely or completely so. That is, it is 
possible that the rate of protection remained unchanged despite the decreases in the tariff at 
Confederation and then the increases that climaxed with the NP.  But before we go any 
further into causes, let us examine the actual growth of the cotton mills more closely.  
3   How Fast Did the Industry Grow? 
If the NP was indispensable to the growth of domestic cotton textiles, as Canadian historians 
suggest, one would expect to find a growth spurt in or around 1879.. Indeed if there is any 
break point in these measures of long term growth it is not on or about 1879, but on or about 
1883, four years later, when the so-called overproduction crisis struck, and the curve of 
growth tilts down.  
 What follows is a structural change test to determine whether there was a structural 
change in the growth rate of the domestic cotton textile mill industry, and thus try to ascertain 
how much of an impact the NP had on the growth of the cotton textile sector after it was 
introduced. 
In this section, we investigate whether there exists a structural change in the growth rate of 
domestic cotton mill industry in or around 1879 when the NP tariff was introduced. Using the 
time series of domestic cotton mill production input deflated by a Canadian cotton goods 
price index, we conduct the structural change tests based on the following trend function: 
݈݋݃ܳ௧ = ߤ଴ + ߚ଴ݐ + ߤଵܫ(ݐ ≥ ଴ܶ) + ߚଵݐܫ(ݐ ≥ ଴ܶ) + ߝ௧   = ܺ௧ᇱΨ + ߝ௧            (1)       
                                                                                t   = 1850,…,1913                 
where ܺ௧ = [1, ݐ, ܫ(ݐ ≥ ଴ܶ), ݐܫ(ݐ ≥ ଴ܶ)]′  and ܫ(ݐ ≥ ଴ܶ)  is the indicator function which is 
equal to one if ݐ ≥ ଴ܶ and zero otherwise. Thus, ߚ଴ and ߚ଴ + ߚଵ represent the average growth 
rates of the real input in 1950~( ଴ܶ − 1) and ଴ܶ~1913  respectively, and ଴ܶ is the point that 
the structural change in the growth rate may occur. We consider the null hypothesis 
ܪ଴: ߚଵ = 0 
which implies no structural change at ଴ܶ. While we introduce ߤଵ and ߚଵ to parameterize the 
structural change in the trend function, we construct the null hypothesis only about ߚଵ 
because our interest is in the growth rate. 
There is large literature on the structural change test in statistics and econometrics. Among 
recent works, we employ the test procedure developed by Perron and Yabu (2009). The test is 
based on the feasible GLS transformation with modification as follows: 
 
(1 − ߙො௦ܮ)݈݋݃ܳ௧ = (1 − ߙො௦ܮ)ܺ௧ᇱΨ + (1 − ߙො௦ܮ)ߝ௧                          (2)                                        
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where ܮ is the lag operator,  
 
ߙො௦ = ߙො ܫ൫ܶఋ|ߙො − 1 > ݀|൯ + ܫ൫ܶఋ|ߙො − 1 ≥ ݀|൯        
(3)                                        
ߙො = ∑ ߝ௧̂ߝ௧̂ିଵ௧்ୀଶ / ∑ ߝ௧̂ିଵଶ௧்ୀଶ             
 
and ሼߝ௧̂ሽ are the OLS residuals based on (1). 
We test the structural change in two different ways. First, we impose the structural change 
point when the NP tariff was introduced ( ଴ܶ = 1879). Perron and Yabu (2009) show that 
when the structural change point is known ிܹௌ(ߣ) defined in (4) converges in distribution to 
a ߯ଶ(1), not only when ߝ௧ is stationary (|ߙ| < 1) but also when it has a unit root (|ߙ| = 1). 
That is, we have 
ிܹௌ(ߣ) = ൣܴ൫Ψ෡ − Ψ൯൧ᇱ[ݏଶܴ(∑ ܺ௧ܺ௧ᇱ௧்ୀଵ )ܴᇱ]ିଵൣܴ൫Ψ෡ − Ψ൯൧ →ௗ ߯ଶ(1)             (4)                                   
with ߣ = ଴ܶ/ܶ,  ܴ = [0 0 0 1]′  and ݏଶ = ܶିଵ ∑ ݁̂௧௧்ୀଵ  where ሼ݁̂௧ሽ   denotes the residuals 
associated with (2). Regarding the choice of ߜ  and ݀  in (3), we use ߜ = 0.5 and ݀ = 1 as 
suggested by Perron and Yabu (2009). The result of test is summarized in Table 2 and Figure 
1. 
Table 2 illustrates that given the structural change point in 1879, the change in growth rate 
is significant even at 1% level ( ிܹௌ(ߣ) > ߯଴.ଽଽଶ (1) = 6.63).  It is interesting, however, that 
the cotton mill industry actually experienced significant decline in growth after the NP was 
introduced. The average annual growth rate was decreased from 16.1%  to 5.3%. Figure 1 
also clearly shows the decrease in growth rate since 1879. This finding is a very strong 
evidence against the conventional wisdom of historians that the growth of Canadian cotton 
mill industry in the second half of the 19th century is mainly attributable  to the NP tariff. 
 
Table 2: Annual growth rate of real input index of cotton mills 
output (1850∼1913) with a structural change in 1879 
 
 Annual growth rate  
Break point Pre Post ிܹௌ(ߣ) 
1879 16.1% 5.3% 42.3 
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Figure 1: Growth of real input index of cotton mills output with 
a structural change in 1879 
 
Now, we conduct the test without imposing a specific change point. In this case, the change 
point is estimated from the data. Based on (2), we construct the following test statistic: 
ܧݔ݌ − ிܹௌ(ߣ) = log ൥
1




where Λ = ሼߣ: ߳ ≤ ߣ ≤ 1 − ߳ሽ for some ߳ > 0. When the structural change point is unknown, 
the limiting distribution of ܧݔ݌ − ிܹௌ(ߣ)  is nonstandard, but can be calculated by 
simulations. We use ߳ = 0.25, in which case the critical values are provided in Perron and 
Yabu (2009). The result of the test is summarized in Table 3 and Figure 2. 
 
Table 3: Annual growth rate of real input index of cotton mills 
output (1850∼1913) with an unknown structural change point 
 
 Annual growth rate  
Break point Pre Post ܧݔ݌ − ிܹௌ(ߣ) 
1883 16.4% 4.3% 25.5 
 


















HINTON, BARBIERO, KIM    The Lessons of the Cotton Mills 
 
 61
The break point is estimated by minimizing the sum of squared residuals from (1). As shown 
in Perron and Zhu (2005), estimating the break point in this way yields a consistent estimate 
whether ߝ௧  is stationary or has a unit root. The findings from this test are very similar to the 
ones with known change point. ܧݔ݌ − ிܹௌ(ߣ) is larger than the critical value (=5.58) at 1% 
level, so we can reject the null hypothesis with strong confidence. We can also see that there 
was a remarkable decline in the growth rate of the cotton textile sector in the early 1880s, 
when there was overproduction crisis in the Canadian cotton textile industry. Indeed, these 
results almost turn the conventional wisdom among historians on its head: soon after the 
introduction of the NP the growth of the cotton textile sector actually slowed down compared 
to the previous three decades.. There may have been other reasons that its rate of expansion 
slowed down, but this is an unexpected occurrence if the NP supposedly drove its growth. 
 
Figure 2: Growth of real input index of cotton mills output 
with an unknown structural change 
 
4    What Are The Lessons? 
 There is still an ongoing debate on the role of tariffs on the growth rate of manufacturing in 
the 19th century. For example, O’Rourke (2000) found tariffs to be positively correlated with 
growth in many countries, including Canada, in the period between 1875 and 1914.  On the 
other hand, we noted above that Dales (1966) and Bertram (1963) were sceptical of the tariff 
effect on Canadian manufacturing output in 19th century Canada.  Of course, correlation does 
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not necessarily imply causation and addressing the causes of growth of the manufacturing 
sector in general can hide different factors affecting the growth rate of different sectors at in 
different periods.  By focusing on just the cotton textile sector in 19th century Canada, we 
have been able to get a closer glimpse of its dynamics and development prior to the onset of 
the NP and compare it with the post-NP growth performance. We saw that the cotton textile 
sector did indeed enjoy quite a bit of effective tariff protection in the 30 some odd years prior 
to the introduction of the NP and but it is from certain the extent to which this protection 
stimulated its growth. 
The Canadian cotton textiles output grew rapidly, increasing at rate of 17-18 per cent a 
year from 1850 to 1883 and then at a more moderate 4.0 to 4.4 per cent a year from1884 to 
1914. Our structural change test shows that this decline in the growth rate was substantial. 
Canadian historians have long claimed  that the cotton industry’s growth depended largely on 
the NP We find, however, that the NP tariff was a relatively unimportant causal factor in the 
growth of the industry. Because:  
1. The Canadian cotton textile industry was a sizable industry before the coming of the 
NP whose trend growth was significantly faster before the NP than after. 
2. The pre-NP “revenue” tariffs offered a much higher potential level of protection 
than historians have realized. As a result, the NP increased tariff rates, but may not 
have increased the actual rate of protection as the tariffs of the 1870s.  
The fundamental lesson of Canada’s cotton mills is that,  the NP tariff increases of 1879 had 
little to do with the industry’s rapid growth. Our analysis   has shown how easy it is to fall 
into the post hoc, ergo propter hoc pitfall in reasoning. We know that tariffs do distort 
domestic price signals and the natural conclusion is to assume that tariffs help increase 
the output of protected domestic industries. However,  the cotton textile sectoralready 
enjoyed protection from foreign  competition prior to the coming of the NP. Hinton and 
Barbiero (2012)  elsewhere cast doubt on the effectiveness of tariff protection on the 
Canadian cotton textile industry even prior to the institution of the NP.  
Perhaps another lesson to be learned by our exercise is the importance of disaggregated 
analysis to get a better understanding of causal factors in economic growth. While analysing 
the growth of the manufacturing sector as a whole can lead to some overall insights as to the 
causes of economic growth,  sectoral analysis is instrumental understanding the particular 
forces that contributed to the growth, or the lack there of,  of an industry in different time 
periods.  
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Appendix: A Note on Statistical Sources 
Table 1:   
 
Annualized rates of growth are calculated between calendar years, or calendar year 
equivalents, 1870, 1890 and 1910. U.S. data refers to raw cotton consumption and is taken 
from United States, Bureau of the Census. 1975. Historical Statistics of the United States. 
Washington, D.C.: GPO; European data refer to imports of raw cotton and are taken from 
B.R. Mitchell. 1975. European Historical Statistics, 1750-1970. London: Macmillan; Indian 
data is raw cotton consumption and is taken from B. R. Mitchell. 2003. International 
Historical Statistics: Africa, Asia, and Oceania, 1750-2000. New York: Palgrave Macmillan; 
Japanese data is raw cotton imports and is taken from S.J. Koh. 1966. Stages of Industrial 
Development in Asia: A comparative history of the cotton industry in Japan, India, China, 
and Korea. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, Appendix, Table 1; Canadian data 
is imports of raw cotton taken from Canada’s Tables of Trade and Navigation. 
 
Data series used in the regression:  
 
Q is a real output of cotton goods index (1890=100) for which we have two measures: The 
money value of output of cotton goods taken from Urquhart (1993) deflated by a domestic 
cotton goods price index, P, (see below) and expressed in index number form; and our real 
input index based on our estimates of the quantity imports of raw cotton (pounds) into the 
Province of Canada and New Brunswick (1850-1867) and the Dominion of Canada (1868- 
1913) from the Tables of Trade and Navigation of the provinces of Canada and New 
Brunswick and The Dominion of Canada.  
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